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PRIVATE LAW
about to be taken from her foot, and might well have balked had
she been warned that such was to be the treatment. It appears
that defendant did not indicate to the patient that the treatment
would be any way different from that earlier received and that
preparations for the treatment would not have indicated such
difference. The court's finding of implied consent seems to be
based primarily upon the presumption that by submitting to
treatment plaintiff had consented to "minor" operations. It is
noteworthy that the court cited no authority for the existence of
such a presumption, and it is submitted that to originate one
would be undesirable. Protection of the medical profession
against frivolous battery suits is of course desirable. On the
other hand, the law is equally concerned with protecting parties
from unconsented-to invasions of personality at the hands of
anyone, and in the instant case it seems that just such an in-
vasion had taken place. In striking a workable balance between
these aims, courts are assisted by the flexibility of the usual
approach to the question of the existence of consent to medical
treatment. A presumption of consent to minor operations
"where the probability of ill consequences is rather remote"'9 6
would, if literally applied, rob this approach of much of its
flexibility.
MARITAL REGIMES'
Robert A. Pascal*
SUITS To ENFORCE COMMUNITY RIGHTS
Ordinarily only the husband may sue to enforce a community
right. The general rule was applied in Warren v. Yellow Cab
Co.,2 a suit to recover for losses borne by the community of
96. Ibid.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Decisions on this subject matter applying well understood principles and
rules, and which therefore need not be discussed, are: Sylvester v. Sylvester, 137
So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1952) on marital property following a reconcilia-
tion; Simon v. Simon, 138 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Succession of
Cazendeck, 138 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; and Monk v., Costin, 134
So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), on the presumption things acquired during
marriage are community property; Johnson v. Shreveport Transit Co., 137 So. 2d
463, (La. App., 2d Cir. 1962) and Gallie v. Ingraham, 140 So. 2d 741 .(La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) on torts of the wife; and Egstrom's of Alexandria, Inc..v. Vaughn,
138 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) on eligibility for homestead rights..:.:
2. 136 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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acquets and gains as a result of wage losses by the wife and
medical expenses attributable to her wrongful injury. Because
of a provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law as enacted in
Louisiana, however, particularly R.S. 7:51, a wife may sue to
enforce payment of a check of which she is holder in due course.
The application of this exceptional rule was illustrated in Van
Horn v. Vining.3
IMPROVEMENTS To SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Succession of Rusciana4 a wife's heirs sued to recover that
spouse's interest in the increased value of the husband's separate
property attributable to community expenditures and efforts
during the marriage. This case required no more than an appli-
cation of Article 24085 of the Civil Code according to well under-
stood interpretations of it. Recovery was based on the value of
the separate property at the termination of the community less
the value the property would have had if the improvements
made at community expense had not been made. In Jenkins v.
Prevost6 a divorced wife claimed reimbursement for (1) "money
and effort" expended in helping her husband build a home on his
land prior to their marriage and (2) one-half of the community
funds expended during marriage on (a) mortgage payments on
and (b) plumbing installations in the same house. The court
estimated the value of her contribution to the house before mar-
riage and allowed her that amount from the defendant husband
individually. Whether the court based this portion of its de-
cision on contract or unjust enrichment rules was not stated in
the opinion. The court also allowed her one-half the cost of
plumbing, installed after marriage, reasoning that the value of
the improvement to the house by such installation had not been
shown to exceed that. The question the court does not appear
to have asked is whether the improvement to the house equalled
the cost thereof, and this should be considered in applying Ar-
3. 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
4. 136 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
5. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2408 (1870) : "When the separate property of either
the husband or the wife has been increased or improved during the marriage, the
other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of
the value of the increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or
ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses or industry; but there
shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due only to the ordi-
nary course of things, to the rise in the value of property, or to the chances of
trade."
6. 140 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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ticle 2408 of the Civil Code. Finally, the court allowed the wife
one-half the amount expended from community funds for pay-'
ment of mortgage notes on the house. Here again this may have
been excessive under the formula of Article 2408, for such pay-
ments undoubtedly contained much by way of interest which
could not have been reflected in improvements to the house.
A third case, Smith v. GarrisonJ involved a widow's claim
for $2,000 lent to her husband from her separate funds for mak-
ing improvements to his separate immovable. This, it will be
noted, is not a case for the application of Article 2408 of the
Civil Code, for that article refers only to improvements to sep-
arate property with community funds or labor. The court al-
lowed the claim, using language which, intentionally or not,
avoided the question whether husband and wife might enter into
the contract of loan with each other." It seemed satisfied to
state that the money had been made available to the husband
and that he had used it "for his individual interest." Accord-
ingly, the basis of decisions must have been unjust enrichment,
a basis which the writer considers valid.
CONTRACTS OF THE WIFE
Tricketts, Inc. v. Viser9 applied the rule that a wife may
obligate her husband for necessaries which she purchases be-
cause of his failure or refusal to supply them. The husband had
argued that he could not be held liable unless the person con-
tracting with the wife had reason to believe that the purchases
were for necessaries and that the husband had failed or refused
to supply them. To support his contention the husband cited
Keller-Zander, Inc. v. Copeland ° and other cases. The court dis-
tinguished the Keller-Zander case and considered the others in-
applicable. Whatever the state of the jurisprudence, it may be
observed that the ignorance or knowledge of the circumstances
under which the wife is acting should not be relevant. First, it
should not be relevant in any case in which the creditor can be
deemed, as a matter of law, to have contracted with the husband.
This the creditor must be deemed to have done in any instance
in which the wife has contracted in his name, whether with
7. 137 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
8.. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1790 (1870) forbids contracts between husband and
wife. -
9. 137 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
10. 196 So. 527 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
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authority'as mandatary (express or tacit mandate), authority
by presumption of law under Article 1786 of the Civil Code, or
without authority as gestor under Article 2299.11 Secondly,
since Louisiana's judiciary has extended the effect of repre-
sentative mandate to mandate without representation (i.e., "un-
disclosed agency")12 it would seem reasonable to conclude that
the creditor should be deemed to have contracted with the hus-
band even where the wife has acted without using the husband's
name but with either conventional or legal authority. On the
other hand, because of the strong language of Article 2299, the
creditor probably would not be deemed to have contracted with
the husband in the event the wife acted as his gestor without
using his name. Thirdly, it should not be necessary for the
creditor to prove knowledge of the circumstances if he sues on
the basis of unjust enrichment, for here the right is founded
simply on the fact of the enrichment of the husband and the
corresponding loss of the creditor without legal cause. On the
other hand the creditor would have to prove knowledge of the
circumstances if he sued as gestor of the husband under Article
2299. In summary, therefore, the creditor's knowledge of the
circumstances should be relevant only where the creditor himself
alleges he has acted as gestor of the husband.
Goldring's Inc. v. Seeling1" also involved a purchase by a wife
in the name of her husband. Here, however, the wife purchased
clothing and charged them to her husband's account. This she
had been authorized to do at one time, but since then the parties
had been separated from bed and board. The court reasoned
that the authorization had not been revoked and therefore the
husband was liable. More specifically, the court found as fact
that the husband had not expressly revoked the authorization of
his wife by notice to the creditor and specifically stated that
the separation would not of itself terminate her authorization.
This conclusion is favorable to a policy of protecting persons
dealing with those once authorized to act as mandataries, but
it may be asked whether the separation from bed and board was
a "change of condition of the principal," which according to Ar-
ticle 3027 of the Civil Code terminates authorization.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2299 (1870) : "Equity obliges the owner, whose busi-
ness has been well managed, to comply with the engagements contracted by the
manager, in his name; to indemnify the manager in all the personal engagements
he has contracted; and to reimburse him all useful and necessary expenses."
12. Sentell v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 29 So. 2d 852 (1947).
13. 139 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
In George L. Ducros Tile Co. v. Ruth14 a judgment creditor
of the wife attached a joint account of the husband and wife.
The court found as fact that the joint account had been opened
by the husband to permit the wife to pay household and other
community expenses and contained only funds deposited by him.
Thus, none of the funds in the account were deemed to be funds
of the wife and accordingly the attachment was dissolved. The
decision is certainly correct. In Louisiana a joint account is no
more than authority to each person to draw out the funds de-
posited to it, and of itself is not an indication of ownership be-
tween or among the parties.
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SEPARATION AND DIVORCE SUITS
Act 178 of 1962, amending Article 155 of the Civil Code,
expressly recognizes the "liability of the community for the at-
torneys' fees and costs incurred by the wife in the action in
which the judgment [of separation or divorce] is rendered."
The prior jurisprudence was to the same effect and among those
decisions are three rendered within the period covered by this
symposium but before the passage of Act 178 of 1962.15 These
decisions, therefore, are of no special lasting significance on this
point. Nevertheless, it may be well to point out how very
strange the rule of the jurisprudence and the new legislation is.
The attorneys' fees of the wife are payable only out of the com-
munity assets,1 and, if there are none, the wife alone must bear
them. This may happen either because the community is itself
negligible or insolvent, or because the parties lived under a
regime of separate property. If this rule is to be given juridical
basis, it must be that the attorneys' fees are a debt of the wife
for which the community is liable. Actually, this was not the
theory of Judge Tate's opinion in Romero v. Leger.17 It was
Judge Tate's opinion that the husband in his capacity as hus-
band should be liable for an advance of the wife's attorneys'
fees as part of the alimony which he owes the wife pendente
lite. The theory that attorneys' fees are part of that due as ali-
14. 137 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
15. Romero v. Leger, 133 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Meyer v.
Howard, 136 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; and Shockley v. Shockley, 141
So. 2d 64 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
16. Shockley v. Shockley, 141 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) reflects this
idea. %
17. 133 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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mony pendente lite would, of course, impose the liability of at-
torneys' fees on all husbands, whether or not living under the
community regime. The rule sanctioned by the amendment to
Article 155 is very different.
SECURITY DEVICES
Henry G. McMahon*
In large measure, the fertile soil of this area of our sub-
stantive law was permitted to lie fallow during the past year.
Only three cases of interest, and only one of importance, were
decided by the appellate courts in this field during the past term.
State v. Thoman' actually hinged on issues of fact; but,
nevertheless, the case is of more than passing interest because
of the importance of the legal principles called into play. There,
by a mandamus proceeding, the plaintiff sought to cancel the
inscription of a mortgage on urban property on the ground that
the mortgage note had prescribed. The defendant's answer de-
nied the prescription asserted and alleged that it had been inter-
rupted both by partial payments on and acknowledgment of
the mortgage indebtedness. Apparently without objection by
the plaintiff,2 the defendant reconvened and sought judgment
on the mortgage note and recognition of the mortgage. The
factual issues as to whether there had been any partial payments
or acknowledgments which interrupted the current of prescrip-
tion, decided in favor of the plaintiff by the trial court and in
favor of the defendant by the appellate court, possess no par-
ticular interest to the professional reader. Settled, but none-
theless important, principles of law applied, however, are of
interest. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reiterated the rule
that prescription on a demand note commences to run from the
date of execution, and not from any demand for payment. Both
the trial and appellate courts applied the rule that the obligee
has the burden of proving interruption of prescription on a
written obligation which is prescribed on its face. The appellate
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 135 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
2. Mandamus is a summary proceeding, LA. CODE OF CIVL PROCEDURE arts.
2592(5), 3781 (1960) ; while the reconventional demand is available only in
ordinary proceedings, Id. art. 851. Had the plaintiff excepted timely to the
reconventional demand, it could have been. dismissed. Id. arts. 926(3), 1036.
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